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Abstract: Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to 
sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including 
invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent 
to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and 
therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and 
requires that we consider their welfare. 
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Arthropods can have moral standing irrespective of whether they are sentient. Mikhalevich & 
Powell (2020) (M&P) make an impressive case for taking the welfare of invertebrates seriously in 
ethical decision-making. They rebut arguments that suggest invertebrates, especially arthropods, 
do not count when it comes to welfare—that it is not possible to harm them because nothing 
really matters to them. The presupposition is that for our treatment of invertebrates to matter, 
things must matter to them. We agree that invertebrates matter, and that their welfare is morally 
significant. Where we depart from M&P, and from most of the published commentaries, is in 
what we think makes this true. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and impede progress in 
our treatment of other species, including invertebrates. We turn instead to other well-
documented aspects of invertebrate minds that pertain to their welfare: Even if arthropods are 
not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This 
kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and makes invertebrate welfare morally significant. 
Sentience, whatever its functional value, is not logically necessary for the bulk of animal 
behavior (nonhuman and human). Well established among myriad such examples are the 
following: Blindsight is a condition in which cortically blind subjects have no awareness of visual 
stimuli yet they are able to discriminate features such as movement, location, orientation, and 
color (Weiskrantz, 1995). Basic learning processes -- long the dominant interest in psychology, 
and the root of flexible behavior -- occur outside of awareness in humans, with no apparent role 
for sentience in autonomous systems (Michie et al. 1994). Beyond perception and learning, even 
complex decision making in humans is facilitated by processes outside awareness (Dijksterhuis, 
2004). Hence, sentience need not drive other species’ behavior.  
To survive and flourish most animals nevertheless have motivational systems that drive 
them toward goals flexibly, in ways that differ from straightforward physical phenomena like an 
air bubble’s rise toward the surface of water. The air bubble’s behavior is dictated by the physical 
forces alone, whereas many invertebrate species, for example, honeybees (Wei et al. 2002), can 
make decisions among alternatives to reach their goals and can learn based on the outcomes. 
(Carruthers, 2018a, discusses curiosity in insects.) It is such flexible goal-driven behavior that 
William James (1890) considered criterial for having a psychology (or a mind).  
In humans, the motivational systems that drive our learning and decision-making include 
representations of bodily states associated with emotion and assessments of the probability of 
different bodily states given different possible outcomes (Bechara and Damasio 2005). Whereas 
much of this assessment seems to take place with conscious access in humans, there is no reason 
to suppose that these integrative representational systems for driving flexible action require 
sentience to function (Cook 2017).  
Much more evidence is needed about how arthropods and other invertebrates evaluate 
potential behavioral outcomes but there is already clear evidence that some insect nervous 
systems are wired to allow integrative representation of experience and to contribute to future 
behavior. Such systems might also ground interests when the system is capable of valenced and 
internally referenced representations of action-perception schemas (Faber et al. 1999; Perry and 
Barron 2013) -- representations whose contents include a positive or negative relation with the 
environment and the system itself. (Carruthers 2018b discusses valence as a nonconceptual 
representation of value.) For example, an ant may recognize a stimulus that was previously 
associated with bodily harm and thus act to avoid it. There is perhaps a minimal threshold of 
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integration and coordination of representations along with flexibility of representation-based 
behavior, but much of the evidence reviewed by M&P indicates that many arthropods pass this 
threshold: Their nervous systems allow them to represent their own bodies and bodily states, 
link these representations with other representations (e.g., of the environment, either positive 
or negative), and use them flexibly in decision-making (i.e., their responses).  
Although Carruthers (2007) argues that invertebrates exhibit the features of agency, and 
thus have interests that can be thwarted, he denies that such features give invertebrates moral 
claims against us (Fischer 2016). We disagree: agency can be a criterion for moral standing. It is 
very common among theories of moral standing to consider sentience as the necessary and 
sufficient criterion, with agency only an enhancing factor. This is to assume that agency requires 
sentience. However, agency could also be the necessary and sufficient criterion, with sentience 
only an enhancing factor. If invertebrates can be agents, our inability to determine whether they 
are sentient should not be an obstacle to considering their welfare. On this view, the implications 
of rejecting appeals to sentience in arthropods could be no less compassionate than arguments 
relying on the claim that they are sentient. All animals, including humans, have motivations 
operating outside of consciousness to seek out or avoid certain beneficial or harmful stimuli. 
What matters to agents can matter to them as agents, even if it can also matter through 
sentience. Sentience is not necessary for agency, as shown by the examples above. Flexible 
representations and behavior characteristic of agents can occur without sentience and often 
preempt it even in sentient organisms.  
Taking agency—a capacity for flexible action based on representations of potential goal 
states—as an independent source of moral standing is coherent and has a long history in moral 
philosophy. Kagan (2019) recently made such a case, taking the capacity for basic intentional 
action (motivated by internal representations) to be sufficient for agency. Some invertebrates 
would qualify according to his account. Other recent accounts of the moral status of animals have 
argued for the significance of animal agency, even when they claim that sentience and agency 
stand or fall together (Healey and Pepper 2020; Jamieson 2018; Purves and Delon 2018; Sebo 
2017; Wilcox 2020). If, as we argue, agency does not require sentience, then insentient agents 
can have moral standing. 
Organisms that can represent their goals and act flexibly to achieve them can be seen as 
agents. The central insight of theories of well-being according to which ‘desire-satisfaction’ (i.e. 
goal-attainment or -thwarting) contributes to (or detracts from) well-being is that reaching the 
goal matters independently of the feeling of satisfaction. Such theories are not confused. Even if 
some other mental state were required for attainment or thwarting to count (e.g., the 
motivational system registers it and revises action-plans by representing the state of affairs as 
‘bad’, ‘undesired’ or ‘to be avoided’), we would still not have to appeal to sentience. Valenced 
states can motivate intentional action without feeling like anything.  
Arthropods represent the world but also what they are doing. Ants may not know why, 
but we can still answer why ants do what they do; not just in the causal sense but by appealing 
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to reasons.1 Hence, if insects are indeed agents, meaningful claims can be made about 
invertebrate welfare even if it is unknown whether they are sentient, even if it is known that they 
cannot be sentient and even if, as Carruthers (2019) puts it, “there is no fact of the matter” as to 
whether nonhuman animals are sentient. Future philosophical and empirical work could explore 
what sorts of interests different species have and what they entail for our treatment of insects 
and other invertebrates in agriculture, captivity, research, ‘pest’ control, and conservation. 
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